1. Papers
   1. Surveys
      1. Franzese 2002: discussion of different frameworks for policy/voting. Two dimensions: motivation of politicians (office-seeking vs. partisan) and voter behavior (adaptive vs. rational expectations). Emphasis on economic policy cycles: e.g. whether there is a Phillips curve for politicians to exploit. Mostly empirical.
      2. Franzese Jusko 2008: similar to Franzese 2002
      3. Duggan and Martinelli 2015: survey of research emphasizing the role of elections for political accountability. Theoretical. One key question is whether a “*responsive democracy* is possible, in the sense that elected politicians choose policies that converge to the majority winning policy.” Distinguishes between environments with *spatial preferences* and *rent-seeking preferences.*
      4. Palfrey 2015: general survey of experiments in political economy. See part 3 (elections and candidate competition): key topics are “(1) spatial convergence of candidate platforms in competitive elections; (2) retrospective voting; and (3) the importance of polls in transmitting information to voters and coordinating voting in behavior in multicandidate elections.”
         1. **Spatial Convergence** [McKelvey and Ordeshook 1982]: do candidates (in a simple environment) choose the Condorcet winning platform? Yes. Simple environment: known Condorcet point, automatic voting.
         2. **Retrospective Voting** [Collier et al. (1987), McKelvey and Ordeshook (1990a)]: two candidate elections, voters observe payoffs received from winning candidate . . . “on average candidates converge to the median, even in this information-poor environment.”
            1. [Extension with policy preferences]: linear preferences . . . “convergence is achieved , but with a clear alternation of policies. The first candidate tends to choose policies above the median and the opposite for the second candidate, with the biases attenuating over time.”
         3. **Voting and Information** [Collier (1989) and Williams (1991)]: candidate convergence when voters can purchase costly information about candidates . . . “amount of information purchased by voters is correlated in the expected (negative) way with the stability of candidate strategies, the imprecision of the information, and the probability of casting a pivotal vote”