1. Papers
   1. Surveys
      1. Franzese 2002: discussion of different frameworks for policy/voting. Two dimensions: motivation of politicians (office-seeking vs. partisan) and voter behavior (adaptive vs. rational expectations). Emphasis on economic policy cycles: e.g. whether there is a Phillips curve for politicians to exploit. Mostly empirical.
      2. Franzese Jusko 2008: similar to Franzese 2002
      3. Duggan and Martinelli 2015: survey of research emphasizing the role of elections for political accountability. Theoretical. One key question is whether a “*responsive democracy* is possible, in the sense that elected politicians choose policies that converge to the majority winning policy.” Distinguishes between environments with *spatial preferences* and *rent-seeking preferences.*
      4. Palfrey 2015: general survey of experiments in political economy. See part 3 (elections and candidate competition): key topics are “(1) spatial convergence of candidate platforms in competitive elections; (2) retrospective voting; and (3) the importance of polls in transmitting information to voters and coordinating voting in behavior in multicandidate elections.”
         1. **Spatial Convergence** [McKelvey and Ordeshook 1982]: do candidates (in a simple environment) choose the Condorcet winning platform? Yes. Simple environment: known Condorcet point, automatic voting.
         2. **Retrospective Voting** [Collier et al. (1987), McKelvey and Ordeshook (1990a,b)]: two candidate elections, voters observe payoffs received from winning candidate . . . “on average candidates converge to the median, even in this information-poor environment.”
            1. [Extension with policy preferences]: linear preferences . . . “convergence is achieved , but with a clear alternation of policies. The first candidate tends to choose policies above the median and the opposite for the second candidate, with the biases attenuating over time.”
         3. **Voting and Information** [Collier (1989) and Williams (1991)]: candidate convergence when voters can purchase costly information about candidates . . . “amount of information purchased by voters is correlated in the expected (negative) way with the stability of candidate strategies, the imprecision of the information, and the probability of casting a pivotal vote”
   2. Recent Papers
      1. Woon 2012: investigates a PE model with two equilibria. In one equilibrium, politicians signal their expertise, and in the other politicians signal their preference alignment with voters; the former equilibrium corresponds to “prospective voting” and the latter corresponds to “retrospective voting.” In the experiment, one politician is matched with one voter.
   3. Older Papers
      1. Collier et al. 1987